Designated Pilot Examiner
ATP | CFI | CFII | MEI | CSIP
Currently providing evaluations for Private Pilot Airplane Single Engine Land (ASEL) for the Southern California area
Instrument, Commercial and Multi-Engine checkrides are anticipated to be added at the beginning of 2027.
By visiting this website, there's a high probability you're immersed in your flight training and have your checkride in sight — at your 12 o'clock. Whether you're beginning your aviation career or pursuing an exciting new skill for business or personal achievement, you've come to the right place.
It's truly my honor to share in both the excitement and the nerves that come with your decision to pursue this dream. My life-long passion for aviation and over 20 years of flying experience have afforded me the opportunity to see the world and share with others the unique experiences that only aviation can provide. I'm thrilled to be part of your journey as you work toward earning your wings.
Thank you in advance for choosing me to be a part of your checkride experience. I look forward to being part of your Private Pilot checkride.
With over 20 years of flying experience, I've been immersed in aviation from day one. I began my training at one of Southern California's busiest airports—a challenging environment that laid the groundwork for strong airmanship. At the same time, I was earning a degree in aviation from a collegiate aviation degree program. That blend of real-world intensity and disciplined academic preparation taught me one core truth: solid foundations create lasting safety.
Though my original goal was to fly for the airlines, I quickly discovered a deep passion for instruction. I've spent over 15 years as a full-time instructor and more than a decade as Assistant Chief Flight Instructor at a Part 141 flight school, conducting flight and ground evaluations. I later returned to the college where I trained — this time as an instructor — helping guide the next generation of aviators.
Outside the instructional realm, I've flown extensively in corporate and Part 135 charter operations, from the King Air 350 up to the Falcon 900. I'm now on the Phenom 300, one of the finest aircraft I've flown.
Throughout every phase of my career—whether in the cockpit or the classroom—my goal has remained the same: go beyond expectations and build a foundation that lasts. I believe that training harder upfront makes the path easier later. This approach reduces repetition and raises retention.
Now, as your Designated Pilot Examiner, I'm looking forward to helping you achieve your wings. One of my primary focuses is to make sure you have as much clarity as possible on what to expect during your practical test (checkride). By understanding exactly what you'll face, you can prepare adequately and we can make this experience as smooth as possible.
As an FAA Designated Pilot Examiner, I act as a representative of the FAA when conducting practical tests. I follow FAA Order 8000.95 (Designee Management Policy), FAA Order 8900.1, and the applicable Airman Certification Standards.
Every practical test is conducted and graded strictly to the ACS. No applicant receives preferential treatment, reduced scrutiny, or advance knowledge of test content — regardless of where they trained, who their instructor is, or whether they have an account on this website.
I do not conduct a practical test for any applicant to whom I have personally provided flight or ground instruction for the certificate or rating sought, whether or not that instruction was logged. The self-study resources on this site are general study material drawn from public FAA sources, available to any pilot who creates a study account; they are not instruction from me, involve no one-on-one teaching or logbook endorsements, and do not create an instructor relationship.
The resources on this site are general preparation drawn from public FAA sources: the ACS, FAA handbooks, the AIM, Advisory Circulars, and 14 CFR. They are written to prepare a pilot for a practical test with any examiner. They do not contain, preview, or predict the scenarios, questions, or content of my practical tests.
Once a pilot applies for a practical test with me, the study resources are removed from their account. Their use or non-use has no bearing on scheduling, evaluation, or outcome.
My examination fee is disclosed in writing before a test is scheduled and is the same for every applicant.
Any concern about a practical test I conduct may be directed to me or to the FAA Flight Standards District Office. This site is independently operated and is not affiliated with or endorsed by the FAA.
Real flights, real lessons. Each event below is broken down the way pilots debrief a flight: the recordings, what happened, why it happened, and what to watch for in your own flying. Details are checked against flight data and official reports, and anything that isn't confirmed yet is labeled that way. Comments are open to everyone — keep them professional.
Saturday, October 24, 2026 · Runway 28R departure, runway 10L landing · Cessna 185 Skywagon (N9955X), Part 91 · Outcome: the pilot landed back at the airport — no injuries and no damage reported · Status: no official report on this event has been published yet (checked October 28, 2026)
The tower recording with the radar picture, published by VASAviation (audio via LiveATC, radar from ADS-B data). The synchronization between the audio and the radar is the publisher’s edit, not an official record.
Every student pilot is taught some version of the same rule: if the engine quits after takeoff, land straight ahead — the turn back to the runway, the “impossible turn,” is the one that kills people. On a Saturday afternoon in San Diego, a Cessna 185 pilot lost the engine in the climb, turned back anyway, and landed on the airport. Times below are Pacific Daylight Time, from the flight record:
What is known: the power loss happened at the worst point in the flight and the lowest point in the climb. The pilot reported it on the frequency, and the flight record shows an airplane that stopped climbing at very low altitude and came straight back. What is also known is how little margin there was: about 470 feet above the ground is the very bottom of the band where a turn back can work at all. The geometry helped — the turn began almost immediately, the reciprocal runway was right there, and the nearest weather observation (12:53 PM, wind 320° at 7 knots, clear) means the landing on runway 10L carried only a light tailwind.
What is not known yet: why the engine quit. No FAA or NTSB report on this event has been published (checked October 28, 2026), and a safe landing with no damage may never produce one. Until something official exists, any stated cause is speculation. This section will be updated if a report appears.
FlightAware flight record and track for N9955X, October 24, 2026 (times, runways, altitudes); tower audio and radar reconstruction published by VASAviation, October 27, 2026 (audio via LiveATC; ADS-B data via Airplanes.Live); Montgomery-Gibbs (KMYF) weather observation, October 24, 2026. Prepared October 28, 2026.
Tuesday, October 20, 2026 · Runway 12R · Jazz Aviation (Air Canada Express) CRJ-900, St. Louis → Toronto · Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-800, Minneapolis/St. Paul → St. Louis · Outcome: no injuries, no damage — both flights continued · Status: the FAA has not published a statement on this event yet (checked October 21, 2026)
Local news coverage with the tower audio. The full recording with the radar picture: Runway Reports (Facebook) · FlightDrama reconstruction (Instagram)
On a normal Tuesday morning at St. Louis, tower cleared a CRJ-900 for takeoff on runway 12R while a Southwest 737 was on final approach to land on the same runway. The controller caught the conflict seconds later and cancelled the takeoff clearance with a call nobody in aviation ever wants to hear directed at them. Times below are Central Daylight Time, from flight-tracking records:
What is known: for a short window, one runway held two active clearances — a takeoff clearance for the CRJ and a landing clearance for the 737 on final. The layers that are supposed to catch that worked at the last moment: the controller recognized the conflict and cancelled the takeoff clearance with repeated, urgent calls, and the Jazz crew stopped immediately and said so on the radio.
What is not known yet: why the takeoff clearance was issued in the first place, and exactly where the CRJ was when the stop call came — its “holding position” readback and the radar reconstructions show it holding short of the runway, but that has not been officially resolved, and it is the detail that decides how the event gets classified. The FAA has not published a statement or a finding. This section will be updated when it does — until then, anything beyond the facts above is a guess.
FlightAware flight records for JZA886 and SWA3082, October 20, 2026 (runways and times); St. Louis tower audio as published in the recordings linked above; local television news segment embedded above. Prepared October 21, 2026.
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.
Wednesday, September 30, 2026 · Pebbly Beach Seaplane Base (L11), Avalon, Catalina Island → Torrance · REACH Air Medical Services EC135 P2+ (N313RX), Part 135 air medical flight · Outcome: the pilot, the flight nurse, and the patient were fatally injured; one medical crew member was seriously injured and a passenger received minor injuries · Status: NTSB investigation ongoing — probable cause has not been determined
Pilot Steven Robinson, 59, a former Marine Corps helicopter pilot, flight nurse Jessica deVries, 48, and the patient, Catalina Romero, 45, did not survive. This page exists so that what is learned from that night protects other crews.
News coverage of the two departures that night (CBS Los Angeles). Accident-night coverage: KTLA segment. There is no radio recording of this flight — Pebbly Beach is a non-towered helipad, and investigators are working from ADS-B data and surveillance video.
The crew had flown from the mainland to Catalina Island to pick up a patient who needed mainland hospital care — one of roughly 250 medical flights off the island each year. Sunset that evening was 6:37 PM. By the time they lifted off for the return flight, it was full darkness on a moonless night, over a calm ocean. From the NTSB’s preliminary report and the reporting that followed:
What is known: the environment. A shoreline helipad, a departure straight out over open water, a moonless night, and a calm sea give a pilot almost nothing to look at — no horizon, no lights, no surface texture, and no visual way to judge height above the water. And it was not only the accident crew that the environment caught: about a minute earlier, a second professional crew on the same departure, wearing night-vision goggles, descended all the way into the water without noticing and recovered only after touching it. The FAA is investigating that event separately, and investigators have not determined whether the two are connected.
What is not known yet: why the REACH helicopter descended. The NTSB has published only its preliminary, factual report — no probable cause, and no factor (disorientation, mechanical, or anything else) has been ruled in or out publicly. This section will be updated when the Board publishes its findings.
Background, not a finding: the night over-water climb-out is a documented trap. With no visual references, a pilot’s senses can insist the helicopter is climbing while it sinks — the “black hole” problem. The NTSB found that pattern in a nearly identical 2005 accident, another EC135 that flew into the Potomac River at night: probable cause was the pilot’s failure to identify and arrest the descent, with the dark night, limited outside visual references, and an inoperable radar altimeter contributing. The Board’s special study of medical helicopter operations also found that while about 38% of those flights happen at night, about 49% of the accidents do.
NTSB preliminary report (narrative as released); AvWeb; Los Angeles Times via Aviation Pros; Desert Sun. Early news reports cited a peak altitude of about 175 feet from flight-tracking data; the preliminary report’s ADS-B figure is about 90 feet, which is the figure used here. Prepared October 21, 2026.
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.
Tuesday, December 27, 2022 · Runway 25 (4,884 ft) · Embraer Phenom 300 (EMB-505) N16DF, Jackson Hole (KJAC) → Hawthorne · Single pilot (ATP, 4,315 hours) and five passengers · Outcome: substantial damage to the left wing; all six aboard uninjured, no fire · Status: NTSB final report published — WPR23LA081, April 20, 2023
Footage of the jet leaving the end of Runway 25 and going through the localizer antenna array, via luisworld911 on YouTube. News crews filmed the aftermath the same night: ONSCENE TV (YouTube)
An Embraer Phenom 300 (EMB-505), N16DF — owned by SkyStallion LLC and operated by Solairus Aviation — flew an IFR trip from Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to Hawthorne’s Jack Northrop Field, flown single-pilot under Part 91 with five passengers aboard. The pilot, a 35-year-old ATP with 4,315 hours, checked the destination weather before landing — calm wind and light rain — calculated the jet’s landing performance, and judged Hawthorne’s 4,884-foot Runway 25 adequate. The automated observation nine minutes before the accident showed a 3-knot wind from 090° — a light tailwind on Runway 25 — with 7 miles visibility in light rain and an overcast at 2,900 feet.
On the wet runway at night, the jet touched down and, in the pilot’s words, “failed to decelerate at the normal rate” despite maximum braking and the emergency brake. Trying to scrub off speed, she started a right turn; the Phenom left the departure end of the runway, struck approach lighting and the airport perimeter fence, and stopped with substantial damage to its left wing. All six people aboard got out uninjured and there was no fire. The airport stayed closed until the jet was removed. Times below are Pacific:
What officials determined: the NTSB’s probable cause reads, in full: “A runway overrun due to the pilot’s failure to stop the airplane as a result of diminished braking action due to a water contaminated runway surface.” The Board’s findings point the same way — rain and a wet surface degrading the airplane’s braking. The pilot reported no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures, and nothing in the record contradicts that: the brakes were asked for everything they had, and the wet runway could not give it.
What the record does not say: the final report publishes no touchdown point and no touchdown speed, so how much runway remained when the jet touched down is not in the public record. This was a Class 4 investigation — the NTSB did not travel to the scene — and the report does not reconstruct the landing roll.
NTSB Aviation Investigation Final Report WPR23LA081 (published April 20, 2023) and its public docket; AeroXplorer, “Private Jet Skids Off Runway at Hawthorne Municipal” (December 2022). Prepared October 21, 2026.
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.
Wednesday, March 13, 2019 · Runway 25L, Compton/Woodley Airport (KCPM), Compton, California · North American T-28B Trojan (N5440F), returning to Compton after maintenance · Cessna 152 (N48962), Long Beach Flying Club instructional flight from Long Beach · Outcome: the student pilot in the Cessna was killed and his instructor seriously injured; the T-28 pilot was not injured · Status: NTSB investigation complete — probable cause published (WPR19FA095)
Two airplanes converged on the same runway at a non-towered airport in the last minutes of daylight. One crew was flying the pattern and making its calls. The other pilot could not see them, could not hear them, and did not know they were there.
The one-minute audio debrief. Bystanders filmed the collision, and the NTSB used that footage to fix the sequence of events; the account below is built from the Board’s final report.
Compton/Woodley is a non-towered airport with parallel runways, 25L and 25R. Sunset that evening was 6:59 PM. All times are local (PDT):
What the NTSB found: the Board’s probable cause was “the failure of the T-28 pilot to see and avoid the Cessna while landing with reduced visibility due to sun glare, which resulted in a collision on the runway,” with his failure to use the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency during the approach and landing contributing.
The radio: when investigators powered up the T-28, its radio was tuned to 125.00 with 121.50 in standby — not Compton’s CTAF, 123.05. The pilot was neither hearing the pattern’s position reports nor broadcasting his own. His Flight Guide’s Compton page was missing entirely, and from his seat the radio’s frequency display was partially obscured. The CTAF was not recorded and the Cessna’s radio settings were destroyed in the fire, so exactly what was said on frequency cannot be proven — but the T-28 was not on it.
The geometry: at the moment of the collision the sun sat at an azimuth of 267 degrees, half a degree above the horizon — essentially straight ahead on a westbound final. And the pairing was the worst kind: one of the fastest piston singles ever built overtaking one of the slowest trainers, on a 3,322-foot runway. Once the Cessna was invisible to him, the closure did the rest.
NTSB Aviation Investigation Final Report WPR19FA095 — final report (PDF) — including the analysis and probable cause, radar data, the radio and Flight Guide examination, solar position calculations, and the bystander video frames the Board reviewed. Prepared October 21, 2026.
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.
Wednesday, October 19, 1988 · Runway 23, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport, Ahmedabad, India · Indian Airlines Boeing 737-200 (VT-EAH), Bombay (Mumbai) → Ahmedabad · Outcome: 133 of the 135 people aboard were killed, including all six crew members; two passengers survived · Status: investigation complete — a controlled flight into terrain, with the findings summarized below
The airplane was working exactly as it should. Nothing on board failed. Flight 113 is the accident that defines controlled flight into terrain on an instrument approach — and the trap it fell into, both pilots looking outside for a runway neither of them could see while the altitude quietly ran out, has not changed since 1988.
The one-minute audio debrief. There is no video of this flight and no publicly released cockpit recording — 1988 predates all of that. The account below is built from the official inquiry’s findings, including what the cockpit voice recorder showed about the final approach.
Flight 113 was a routine morning domestic hop, about an hour in the air. All times are local (IST):
What the inquiry found: a textbook controlled flight into terrain. The official investigation attributed the crash to errors of judgment by the captain and the first officer in poor visibility: attention fixed on acquiring the runway visually, the altimeter not monitored, descent below the minimum descent altitude without the required visual reference, an approach flown well above its prescribed speed, and required callouts not made. Both recorders were recovered, and the cockpit voice recorder is the clearest evidence — in the crew’s anxiety to see the field, neither pilot was flying the altitude.
Around the crew, the system was thin: the inquiry also criticized the airport authorities. The deterioration in visibility was not adequately communicated and no runway visual range was provided; the approach lights were not functioning, and Ahmedabad had no complete instrument landing system — the localizer approach the crew flew was all there was. None of that excuses flying below minimums, but it meant the chart, the DME, and the altimeter were the entire safety case that morning.
The official inquiry’s findings as summarized in the reference record for Indian Airlines Flight 113 (aircraft history, timeline, and recorder evidence); Flight RouteXplorer retrospective, posted October 19, 2026. Prepared October 21, 2026.
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.
FAA safety articles on high-risk items, analyzed and condensed into an easy-to-read format to keep aviation safer.
Source: Seth Blake, Arkansas FAASTeam Lead Representative — video walkthrough
The FAA WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program is a free way to stay current and satisfy your flight review, run through the FAASafety.gov website. The site isn't the most polished, but it works: you build a profile, then earn credit through courses, seminars, webinars, and flight activities. Completing a full "phase" (three ground activities plus three flight activities) counts as a flight review and gives the FAA a visible record that you're an active, proficient pilot.
WINGS isn't flashy, but it's a legitimate, free path to a flight review and real proficiency. The main thing to understand is the split between ground credit (courses, seminars, webinars) and flight credit (activities that require a validator's sign-off) — get familiar with both sides early so a completed phase doesn't sneak up on you.
Source: Carl Valeri, FAASTeam Lead Representative, Tampa FSDO — Topic of the Month, February 2015
This FAASTeam video makes the case that a pilot's real capabilities shift day to day, so relying on regulatory minimums alone isn't enough. Pilots need documented personal minimums, built using the PAVE framework from Chapter 8 of the FAA's Risk Management Handbook, that they deliberately adjust — only in a more conservative direction, unless they've specifically built up the skill or equipment to justify going the other way.
Personal minimums turn "know your limits" into something concrete: a PAVE-based assessment of pilot, aircraft, environment, and external pressures, written down, reviewed with an instructor, and only ever relaxed once you've specifically built the skill or equipment to back it up.
Source: FAA Safety Briefing, Summer 2026
Weather is the biggest variable in general aviation safety, and most weather-related accidents come down to the same few mistakes: misjudging a thunderstorm, pushing VFR into clouds, skipping the bigger-picture forecast, or leaving no trail for search-and-rescue. This guide condenses the key lessons — thunderstorm hazards, reading fronts and clouds, choosing the right forecast tool at the right time, avoiding VFR-into-IMC, and filing a flight plan that actually protects you.
These hazards are ordinary parts of summer flying — what separates a safe flight from an accident is preparation: understanding the weather instead of just reacting to it, using the right tool at the right time, having a firm VFR limit, and leaving an accurate trail behind you.
Source: FAA Safety Briefing; DPE checkride observations
Runway excursions and hard landings are among the most common general aviation accidents, and a striking share of them start with an unstable approach that the pilot chose to continue. Industry studies have found that only a small fraction of unstable approaches end in a go-around — the rest are flown to the runway on hope. The go-around is the cheapest, simplest emergency procedure in aviation, yet pilots treat it as a last resort instead of a normal option. This article breaks down why the decision is so hard in the moment and how to make going around your default.
The go-around decision is made on the ground, not on short final. Set your stabilized gate, brief the missed approach every time, and treat going around as the normal outcome of an approach that isn't working — because the accident record shows what happens when pilots treat landing as the only option.
Source: Michelle Cole, FAASTeam Representative — video case study
This case study follows a father-and-son team, Phil and Junior, along with A&P mechanic Kevin, performing owner-assisted maintenance on a GA aircraft. It's built as an observational exercise: watch each character's decisions and judge whether they're reasonable, legal, and safe. The scenario — a routine oil change and oil sample submission, repeatedly interrupted by phone calls — shows how human factors like task-saturation, multitasking, and inconsistent procedure can create risk even during "simple" maintenance.
Nobody in the story does anything outright illegal — the point is that small process shortcuts and unmanaged interruptions are exactly the kind of everyday human-factors risks that can quietly set up a bigger mistake. Solid checklist discipline, clear supervision boundaries, and a deliberate way of resuming after a distraction are simple habits that close that gap.
Source: FAASTeam video case study, continuing the Chapter 1 story
Continuing the case study, Chapter 2 follows Phil, Kevin, and Junior through the rest of the maintenance job, a schedule-pressured handoff, and the decision of how to safely proceed to a test flight before flying the family to lunch. It surfaces subtler risks than Chapter 1: rushed decisions under pressure, an incomplete handoff, ambiguous supervision once the mechanic leaves, and the importance of accurate maintenance recordkeeping.
Chapter 2 shows how easily a well-run maintenance job can pick up small cracks — a rushed handoff, an unclear supervision chain, a distracted trainee — while nothing looks obviously wrong in the moment. The fix isn't dramatic: slow down under pressure, confirm who's actually responsible for what, and log work accurately so it can be traced back to the person who did it.
Source: FAA runway safety training video
This FAA training video argues that human factors, not technology, remain the deciding variable in runway safety. Drawing on real tower operations, two serious incidents (Boston Logan, 2005, and Chicago O'Hare, 2006), and interviews with controllers, pilots, and a USC human-factors researcher, it makes the case that continuous education — technical and human-factors alike — is the single biggest lever pilots and controllers have to prevent runway incursions.
Technology keeps improving air traffic management, but the video's consistent message — from tower controllers to a human-factors researcher — is that people remain the deciding factor in runway safety. Staying sharp against complacency, working the full system rather than just your own role in it, and committing to continuing education are what actually close the gap between a near-miss and a safe outcome.
Source: FAA Safety Team presentation, Safety Stand-Down ("Don't Be Surprised, Be Prepared")
This talk turns the vague advice to "be safe" into something actionable. Building on the FAASTeam's Perceive–Process–Perform model, the speaker introduces AWARE — Aircraft, Weather, Airspace, Reality, and External pressures — as five categories pilots should continuously scan to stay ahead of surprises. This excerpt covers the Aircraft category in full and opens the Weather category.
"Be safe" only becomes actionable once it's broken into something you can actually check. AWARE gives pilots a repeatable scan — starting with a genuinely skeptical preflight and a structured way to read weather and cockpit automation — so surprises in the aircraft, the weather, or your own assumptions get caught early instead of in the air.
Source: FAA ADS-B program briefing, Robert Nichols, Surveillance Services Group Manager
This FAA program briefing explains what Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast actually is, why the FAA built it, and what it means for GA pilots now that the January 1, 2020 equipage mandate is in effect. It covers the two data links, the free traffic and weather benefits, where equipage is actually required, and the ground infrastructure behind it.
For most GA pilots flying where a transponder is already required, ADS-B Out equipage is not optional, but the technology is meant to be a safety and situational-awareness upgrade — free traffic and weather in the cockpit — rather than an added restriction. The practical takeaway: verify your ADS-B Out performance is compliant — the FAA offers a free Public ADS-B Performance Report that checks your installation against the rule requirements.
Source: FAA-designated pilot examiner presentation, "Flight Training Missing Links" series — The Stabilized Approach
An FAA-designated pilot examiner argues that most unstabilized approaches don't come from not knowing "on speed, on glideslope" — they come from three overlooked culprits baked into how landings are typically taught: over-reliance on power-on approaches, the touch-and-go, and a late (or never-really-made) go-around decision. The core theme: knowledge has to come first, because "the eye can't see what the mind doesn't know."
Unstabilized approaches usually trace back to how landings are taught, not just how they're flown in the moment: leaning on power instead of practicing the glide, using touch-and-goes as a stand-in for real landing practice, and treating the go-around as an afterthought. The fix is simple: fly full-stop landings deliberately, and pre-commit to the go-around as part of every approach briefing.
Source: Larry Botha, Master CFI Emeritus & FAASTeam Lead Representative — FAA Safety Center presentation
This presentation makes the case that most GA checklists — whether decades-old originals or brand-new laminated cards bought off the shelf — are outdated the moment an airplane gets modified with new avionics, autopilots, or removed equipment. The average GA airplane is around 40 years old and has changed significantly since it left the factory, but its checklist usually hasn't. The talk covers why and how to build a custom checklist, plus the habits that make any checklist useful.
A checklist is only as good as its match to the airplane you're actually flying and the habits around using it. Building or updating a custom checklist that reflects real equipment, is easy to read, and is genuinely referenced — especially after interruptions — closes a gap that even experienced pilots fall into as familiarity breeds complacency.
Source: FAA #FlySafe campaign — Prevent Loss of Control Accidents
Loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) is the number one root cause of fatalities in general aviation — roughly 450 people die in GA accidents each year, and on average one fatal LOC accident happens every four days. A LOC accident is an unintended departure from controlled flight: the airplane enters a regime outside its normal envelope and quickly develops into a stall or spin, often introducing an element of surprise the pilot never trained for.
LOC-I kills more GA pilots than anything else, and it almost always starts with something preventable: decaying airspeed, an unrecognized stall, or a maneuver that left no margin. The defenses are unglamorous — airspeed discipline, honest proficiency, thorough transition training, and a real post-maintenance preflight — but they address the exact factors the FAA keeps finding in the wreckage.
Source: FAA Safety Briefing, January/February 2026 — FAA/GAJSC loss-of-control safety enhancements
Airspeed tells you how fast you're going; angle of attack tells you what the wing is actually doing. An AoA indicator shows your margin above the stall directly — regardless of weight, bank angle, or configuration — which is exactly the information that goes missing in the accidents the FAA keeps investigating. The FAA and the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee both recommend AoA indicators as a direct counter to loss-of-control accidents.
Since loss of control is GA's top fatal accident category and stalls are at its center, an instrument that shows stall margin directly — in every configuration, at every weight — is one of the highest-leverage safety upgrades a pilot can make. Whether factory-installed or retrofitted under the streamlined Part 23 rules, AoA turns the invisible (how close is the wing to quitting?) into something you can see and hear.
The days Ryan has open for checkrides. To reserve one, create a free Pilot account (or log in) and go to Reserve Your Checkride. Dates can be reserved until 24 hours before the 8:00 AM start, and open days can fill, so this can change.
Discussion
No account needed. Comments are public and moderated — keep it professional.